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Introduction  
Journalists should protect their sources. They should, above all, protect those sources (including 
whistleblowers), that have provided them with information in confidence. This principle is included in 
journalistic codes of ethics around the world. It is a precept that is frequently interpreted rigidly, and 
at times so rigidly that it can put journalists in direct conflict with legal requirements to disclose 
information. Should a journalist comply with the law but break the ethical rule, the journalistic 
community will frequently condemn such an act.  
In the United Kingdom, for example, the seventh principle of the National Union of Journalists’ Code 
is that a journalist “[p]rotects the identity of sources who supply information in confidence and 
material gathered in the course of her/his work” (NUJ, 2011). In 2003, the NUJ expelled a young 
journalist for disclosing the identity of a source, even though he did so because that source had 
confessed to murder (Wallace, 2003). Similarly controversial was The Times’ decision to obey a court 
order to assist police in their prosecution of former Liberal Democrat minister Chris Huhne. In 2012, 
Huhne was charged with perverting the course of justice in a speeding points case: the newspaper 
eventually provided the police with information that identified its informant, although the newspaper 
and the reporter defended their actions (Lewis, 2013). The prevailing assumption, then, is that 
journalists should protect a source that has been afforded confidentiality, whatever the personal and 
organisational cost.  
This chapter considers whether this assumption is realistic. It surveys some of the contemporary legal 
and technological obstacles that journalists face in protecting their sources. It uses the United 
Kingdom as a case study, but similar concerns arise in other places in the world, as reflected by 
current discussions within the European Parliament (Lambert, 2017). Although the legal and 
technological obstacles are integrally connected, we will consider each category separately. The 
analysis is grounded in a round-table discussion that the authors organised at the University of 
London’s Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in September 2016, with the support of Guardian News 
and Media, at which the issue of source protection in a digital age was discussed by 25 experienced 
investigative journalists, lawyers and representatives from NGOs (ILPC, 2017). 
We conclude that, whatever a journalist’s intentions, these obstacles now make protecting a source – 
their identity, and the confidential information they communicate – extremely difficult. In the Huhne 
case, for example, police used powers under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to 
access mobile and landline phone records which identified the source used by a second newspaper 
(the Mail on Sunday). In doing so, they bypassed the need for judicial authorisation, and acted without 
the knowledge of the media organisation and journalist concerned (Craven, 2014). In such an 
environment, how can the NUJ’s seventh principle – and other similar ethical rules – be maintained? 
Given the difficulties of protecting a source, what should a journalist do? In this chapter, we offer 
some legal, practical and technological suggestions.   
The law: balancing interests 
Before we demonstrate how source protection laws in the UK are becoming increasingly ineffective, 
it is first useful to consider briefly why laws of this type exist, and what they seek to do. The laws that 
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govern when, and under what circumstances, journalists can be compelled to reveal the identity of 
their sources arise from a need to balance competing societal interests. On the one hand, there are the 
interests of a source seeking anonymity because of the potential damage caused by the revelation of 
their identity; and the interests of a journalist seeking to protect his or her source, because this 
facilitates the flow of useful information provided by the source. On the other hand, there are the 
interests of the state in – for example - seeking information for the purposes of policing, national 
security or administrating justice.  
It is appropriate to balance these interests because they are frequently instrumental interests, not 
absolute ones. There is no absolute value in protecting the identity of a journalists’ source: sources are 
protected because this helps – amongst other things - journalists perform their ‘watchdog’ function. 
Such activity by journalists is necessary to a thriving democracy, as the European Court of Human 
Rights (amongst other international and national courts) has frequently recognised (see the discussion 
below). Equally, however, there is no absolute value in, for example, protecting national security in 
itself, or the administration of justice in itself. Society, we would argue, protects these interests 
appropriately only because they are instrumental in the protection of higher order interests – such as, 
for example, the right to life, the capacity of humans to flourish, or the imperative to treat individuals 
equally.  
The fact that the societal interests commonly involved in source protection are frequently 
instrumental, not absolute, means they can be traded off against each other. Such trading off, 
however, needs to be predictable yet flexible, and normatively convincing. It is this that the laws that 
protect sources seek to achieve. It is a difficult task because it is difficult to formulate a set of rules 
with these qualities. But, generally speaking, this has been achieved over the past decades in the UK, 
and a relatively effective balance has evolved in response to the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights.  
An example of balancing 
A prominent example of this balance evolving over time can be seen in the application of the general 
statute that governs the protection of sources in UK law - the Contempt of Court Act 1981 (CCA, 
1981). Section 10 CCA 1981 says that  
“[n]o court may require a person to disclose, nor is any person guilty of contempt of court for refusing 
to disclose, the source of information contained in a publication for which he is responsible, unless it 
be established to the satisfaction of the court that disclosure is necessary in the interests of justice or 
national security or for the prevention of disorder or crime”.  
This, it can be seen, creates a basic rule that protects journalists’ sources. It does this both by 
imposing a restriction on the ability of courts to order journalists to reveal their sources, but also by 
restricting the ability of the court to find a journalist, who is protecting their source, in contempt. The 
provision is wide in its range and application. For one thing, it does not only apply to journalists, 
because section 10 CCA 1981 is worded in such a way that bloggers and citizen journalists can use it: 
the section has been described as “indiscriminate in the ambit of its protection” (Blom-Cooper, 2008: 
269).2 For another, sources can be protected even where the information they communicate is of little 
value to society. In the words of a senior judge, Lord Justice Laws, concurring with the judgment of 
the rest of the Court of Appeal in a case in 2001:  
It is in my judgment of the first importance to recognise that the potential vice – the 
‘chilling effect’ – of court orders requiring the disclosure of press sources is in no way 
lessened, and certainly not abrogated, simply because the case is one in which the 
information actually published is of no legitimate, objective public interest. Nor is it 
to the least degree lessened or abrogated by the fact (where it is so) that the source is 
a disloyal and greedy individual, prepared for money to betray his employer’s 
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confidences. The public interest in the non-disclosure of press sources is constant, 
whatever the merits of the particular publication, and the particular source. (Ashworth 
Hospital Authority v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd, Court of Appeal, 2001: [101]) 
But, as part of the balancing of interests, what the section gives with one hand, it takes away with 
another. The protection afforded by the first phrase in section 10 is lessened by the provision’s second 
phrase. One problem for those who wish to protect journalists and their sources is that this is also very 
wide. Consider, as an example, what may be ‘in the interests of justice’, and leave aside for present 
purposes the references in section 10 to national security, and the prevention of disorder or crime. It is 
likely, on the face value of these words at least, that it is in the interests of justice for a court to order a 
journalist to reveal the identity of a source, where that source has broken a duty of confidentiality. 
Duties of confidentiality will frequently be owed by sources to their employers, and a source will 
frequently breach such a duty by talking to a journalist. An employer who has had their confidentiality 
breached in such a way may well have a legal action against the source, and also the journalist.  
Because both aspects of section 10 are wide, and competing interests are embodied in the provision, 
the courts have wrestled with how it should be applied. They have, to adopt the phrase used above, 
sought a balance that is predictable yet flexible, and normatively convincing. It has not been an easy 
process. A more complete survey of the evolution of the case law is beyond the scope of this chapter, 
and can be found elsewhere (for example, Cram 2009; Millar and Scott, 2016; Phillips, 2014), but one 
recurrent issue was that English law was frequently found to be out of kilter with European human 
rights law, in that it paid insufficient regard to the protection of sources (Ashworth HA v MGN Ltd, 
Court of Appeal: [97]; Nicol, 2009: 1.18). 
This led to the UK courts aligning their interpretation of section 10 of the CCA, to the interpretation 
made by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) of article 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) (see Mersey Care v Akroyd (No2) Court of Appeal, 2007). Article 10 protects 
freedom of expression.3 This is engaged, because journalists employ their article 10 rights when 
communicating to the public, and an essential part of such communication can be that they receive 
information from sources. Being able to protect their sources helps maintain that flow of information. 
(Article 8,4 the provision that protects privacy, can also be engaged, and this – as well as article 10 - 
will be discussed in more detail later.) The upshot of this is that section 10 CCA 1981, interpreted in 
the light of article 10, has evolved into a reasonably coherent and effective means of protecting 
sources, which balances such protection against other societal interests.5  
But this protection is being undermined, and it is contemporary legal and technological change that 
has had this effect. Legal issues have arisen because there are other more specific laws that deal with 
particular instances where information is sought from journalists, and these can be less protective of 
journalistic sources than section 10 CCA 1981. Overuse, or inappropriate use of these laws, upsets the 
delicate balance. These laws can generally be divided into two categories – those that apply when 
individuals are seeking information from journalists, and those that apply when it is the state that is 
seeking information. The latter are more important for present purposes. Technological issues have 
arisen because of changes in communication technology, and in particular from data analytic 
techniques that can be applied to meta-data. We will discuss each in turn. 
Upsetting the balance: legal issues 
The statute of central importance to consider where the state is seeking information from a journalist 
is the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE 1984). This established a regime that 
differentiates journalistic material from other information (s 13), which is further classified into either 
‘special procedure material’ (s 14) or ‘excluded material’ (s 11), depending on whether it is held 
under a duty of confidence. If the authorities are seeking disclosure of special procedure material, the 
protections afforded to journalists are lesser, and it is easier to convince a court to order the release of 
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such material. The criteria that have to be applied – the ‘access conditions’ - can be found in schedule 
1 to the Act. It is more difficult for the authorities to gain access to excluded material.  
A senior media lawyer at our round-table said that protections under PACE 1984 for journalistic 
material – whether special procedure or excluded – have proved to be effective. Too effective in fact, 
in the opinion of some, and there have been suggestions that the protections that are afforded by 
PACE 1984 should be narrowed. Lord Justice Leveson, in his investigation into the culture, practice 
and ethics of the press in 2011-2012, explored this possibility, eventually recommending that the 
Home Office should consider amending specific protections contained within PACE (Leveson, 2012: 
42; discussed, for example, in Phillips, 2014). 
But this effective protection provided by PACE 1984 can already be reduced or evaded. One way this 
can happen is where another law provides a route by which the state can apply to the court to gain 
access to journalistic material, and this other route has weaker protections. There is a wide range of 
other laws that are available to the authorities for such a purpose. These include the Terrorism Act 
2000 (section 37 and schedule 5, paragraph 5 and 6), the Criminal Justice Act 1987 (section 2), the 
Inquiries Act 2005 (section 21) and the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (section 13). Each of 
these statutes sets out the circumstances in which a state authority can obtain information, and they 
can overlap. This means that there can be multiple legal avenues through which the state can seek the 
same journalistic material.  
It is here that our research indicated there can be a problem. Where, for example, the state is seeking 
journalistic material that deals with terrorism, the Terrorism Act 2000 applies. Access to material that 
is protected under PACE 1984 as special procedure material, and as excluded material, is gained 
much more easily under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Schedule 5 of the Terrorism Act 2000. A result of this 
is that the balance that attempts to protect conflicting societal interests has been disturbed. Participants 
at our roundtable reported that this a problem because the terrorism laws in question are very broadly 
framed, and that upsets the appropriate balance of competing societal interests described earlier in this 
chapter. (This point is also examined by Danbury in Chapter Two). Support for such a view can be 
found in the fact that the courts have decided that the police have used terrorism laws to gain access to 
journalistic material in situations where they should not have done so.  (To be more precise, the Court 
of Appeal has found that the powers under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 to stop and question 
people, if used in respect of journalistic information, is incompatible with the ECHR because it is not 
‘prescribed by law’: R (Miranda) v Home Secretary. Court of Appeal, 2016: [94 – 117]). The net 
effect of this is that protections that should have been afforded to sources have been evaded. We have 
focused here on the example of terrorism and the Terrorism Act 2000, but other examples of this 
‘legislative arbitrage’ could have been highlighted. It also results in the upsetting of a carefully 
balanced system in areas other than terrorism. 
Upsetting the balance: technological issues 
The second problem with the legal structures that protect sources, beyond this legislative arbitrage, 
results from technological innovation. It also arises because PACE 1984 focuses on protecting 
content, not the protection of sources and their identities as such. That this is a weakness can be 
demonstrated by considering the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA 2000), and how 
the police have used this act to seek journalistic information. RIPA 2000, until recently, provided the 
main legal framework governing the acquisition and disclosure of content and communications data. 
It has been supplemented and replaced in many areas by the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 
2016). But it is worth considering here, because there has been extensive experience of how it 
operates in practice. This experience not only illustrates the point we wish to make, but also offers a 
guide to some of the potential weaknesses of the IPA 2016. It also helps inform our suggestion of how 
these can be ameliorated. 
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RIPA 2000 enables intelligence and security agencies, police, customs and other public agencies to 
access communications data from telecoms companies for a variety of purposes. Part I chapter I 
allows for the interception of communications –in other words, the content. Part I chapter II allows for 
access to communications data through service providers. Part II creates (amongst other things) an 
authorisation defence for covert surveillance by public authorities (this includes following targeted 
people, and filming in public places). Intrusive surveillance (placing probes in houses or cars, and 
similar activities) requires prior judicial authorisation, and is only available for the investigation of 
serious crime, which the Act defines. State interference with property, such as planting a bug or 
installing wireless telegraphy, is dealt with by Part III of the Police Act 1997. 
There is no specific mention made or protection in RIPA 2000 itself for confidential journalistic 
material, which may immediately seem to be a problem. This was, however, addressed by the 
Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice, a document that became 
effective from 25 March 2015. The Code introduced ‘enhanced safeguards’ to protect the article 10 
ECHR rights of journalists (Home Office, 2015: 3.78 and 3.79). Effectively, this provided that where 
confidential journalistic material was likely to be obtained, the processes under PACE 1984 should be 
used. That meant that prior judicial approval would normally be required.  
However, and this is the point, it subsequently became apparent that a number of police forces had 
used the communications data route under Part I chapter II of RIPA 2000, and applied directly to 
telecommunications companies for source-related data. In doing so, they had effectively circumvented 
the protections of PACE 1984 (see, for example, News Group Newspapers v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 2015). Indeed, in February 2015, the Interception 
of Communications Commissioner Sir Anthony May found the Code to be deficient. He 
recommended that it be altered, to “provide adequate safeguards to protect journalistic sources” 
(Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office, 2015: 37). Consequently, a revised Code of 
Practice for the Interception of Communications Data was issued in January 2016 (Home Office, 
2016). 
This highlights the weakness of PACE 1984 from the point of view of journalistic source protection. 
Meta-data – information about communication, rather than the contents of the communication itself – 
can be used by the authorities to identify journalistic sources. This can happen when information 
about who spoke to whom, on what machine, and on which account and when, is cross-referenced 
with other information. Moreover, more sophisticated data analytic techniques can be applied to 
reveal even more sensitive information. This is true in areas beyond journalistic source protection. A 
striking and disturbing example of such techniques being used in the 2016 American Election is 
described by Grassegger and Krogerus (2017.) Yet this meta-data is obtained more easily by 
authorities under RIPA 2000 than PACE 1984, and that means that authorities can evade the carefully 
balanced protections afforded by PACE 1984. 
Here, we have just considered the UK, and in particular the provisions under PACE 1984 and RIPA 
2000, but it is clear that this problem is likely to be more widespread. For one thing, it is likely to 
affect the implementation of the new IPA 2017, and measures of similar ambit – for example, the 
Digital Economy Bill, currently being considered by Parliament. It will also be relevant in other 
countries. As the academic lawyer Andrew Scott explained at the workshop that forms the basis of 
this chapter (ILPC, 2017), “[l]egal protection against disclosure/delivery up orders [is] irrelevant if 
surveillance, retention of/access to communications data, or interception of communications allows 
investigating authorities an easy route to information”. Under such circumstances, it is very difficult – 
if not impossible – for a journalist to protect the anonymity of their sources. The answer to the 
question posed at the beginning of the chapter – can you keep a secret? –  is, from a legal point of 
view, ‘frequently no’. 
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Practical legal responses 
What to do?6 Legally, one way of redressing the balance is to look to the European Court of Human 
Rights. As has been described, the decisions of the ECHR on article 10 has deeply influenced 
decisions of domestic courts on section 10 CCA 1981, and it also influences (amongst other things) 
court interpretations of other laws that relate to source protection. This is because the UK has signed 
up to the European Convention on Human Rights, and incorporated the Convention into UK law by 
the Human Rights Act 1998. Section 3 of the HRA 1998 says that UK courts must interpret domestic 
legislation in a way that is compatible with the Convention, and section 6 indicates that courts 
themselves must act in ways that are compliant with the Convention. 
There are two main articles in the ECHR that are relevant - article 10, already mentioned, which 
protects rights of free speech, and has special application to watch-dog journalism (see, for example, 
Millar and Scott, 2016; Nicolaou, 2012; Phillips, 2014 and the case law following Goodwin v The 
United Kingdom European Court of Human Rights, 1996), and article 8, which protects rights to 
privacy. These provide a standard against which contemporary laws, and the application of them, 
should be judged. It provides a way of assessing whether the balance between the competing societal 
interests, laid out earlier in this chapter, is achieved. 
Article 10 
As indicated above, article 10 protects freedom of speech. The leading ECtHR case on article 10 
relating to source protection in this context is Goodwin (1996). In this case the Strasbourg Court 
found, amongst other things, that: 
protection of journalistic sources is one of the basic conditions for press freedom… 
without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing 
the public on matters of public interest… the vital public-watchdog role of the press 
may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable 
information may be adversely affected… such a measure cannot be compatible with 
Article 10 of the Convention unless it is justified by an overriding requirement in the 
public interest. 
The jurisprudence of the court has laid out a series of tests against which specific laws on source 
protection should be judged. These are based around the ECHR’s three-fold test, that to be 
permissible, any infringement of article 10 should be prescribed by law, pursuant to a legitimate aim, 
and necessary in a democratic society – which includes a requirement that it should be proportionate. 
This means in substantive terms that any law – or its interpretation by the courts – needs to embody a 
variety of factors. These include the need to limit any interference with freedom of speech; to balance 
the public interests at stake between the dissemination of the source’s information and the public 
interest in revealing their identity (or other relevant information); and the motives, objectives, and 
conduct of any journalist and their source. 
The court also sets out some procedural factors that need to be built in to any law. These derive 
significantly from the case of Sanoma Uitgevers BV v The Netherlands (European Court of Human 
Rights, 2010), and include the requirement that any law that interferes with article 10 in relation to 
source protection must have effective legal procedural guarantees for a journalist. In practical terms, 
this means that there must be the guarantee of review by a judge or other independent and impartial 
decision-making body, of a decision that results in the revelation of a source’s identity. Importantly, 
any review of such a decision must be made in advance of access to the information sought. Such a 
view was reinforced by the decision of Telegraaf Media v The Netherlands, European Court of 
Human Rights, 2012). 




As well as article 10, the other jurisprudence of the ECtHR that is relevant relates to article 8 – the 
right to a private life. Both the privacy of a journalist and their source can be interfered with when the 
state seeks to identify a journalist’s source. Moreover, article 8 and article 10 can combine together 
where state surveillance is undertaken specifically to identify sources. (This is not always the case, 
and does not occur, for example, where the procurement of journalistic information is incidental to the 
purposes of an investigation). 
Early guidance from the European court on how to apply article 8 came in Klass v Germany 
(European Court of Human Rights, 1978). This case confirmed the view that state interception or 
surveillance could be legitimate under article 8(2), but only where it is in accordance with the law, 
necessary in a democratic society, and proportionate (the usual test that the ECtHR applies). In 
interpreting this, the court noted that where the state is acting covertly, the individual will necessarily 
be prevented from seeking an effective remedy of his or her own accord, or from taking a direct part 
in any review proceedings. This is because such a person will not know that he or she is under 
surveillance, and will not know that there are any review proceedings in which they can take part. 
That means that, for any interception or surveillance to be compliant with article 8, the supervision of 
state powers in this context must be adequate to compensate for the absence of court oversight. In 
particular, the court subsequently explained in Telegraaf Media, this means that any review must take 
place before, rather than after covert interception or surveillance. This is because, a “review post 
factum… cannot restore the confidentiality of journalistic sources once it is destroyed” (Telegraaf 
Media, [101]). 
Implications for source protection laws 
What do these considerations mean for any evaluation of the law of source protection in the UK? 
They set out minimum standards, against which laws that seek to afford access to journalistic sources 
should be judged. They mean, for example, that the recently passed IPA 2016 needs to be applied in 
such a way that it sufficiently protects journalists’ sources, and provisions on disclosure of public 
authority information in the Digital Economy Bill ought to be drafted with such protection built-in. In 
respect of the IPA 2016, we recommend that this can be achieved by the drafting and adoption of 
Codes of Practice in ways that comply with the ECtHR’s jurisprudence, although we are concerned by 
the lack of an obligation to notify media parties of judicial authorisation requests in the legislation 
itself. In particular, such Codes should ensure that there is independent and impartial – and as far as 
can be achieved, transparent - oversight of any investigation that may reveal a journalist’s sources. 
Where it is proposed that there should be surveillance for the purposes of identifying a source, this 
oversight ought to take place before any surveillance is undertaken. And, more generally, the Code 
should also be alive to, and prohibit, the abuse – or over-use – by the authorities of laws that permit 
access to meta-data and data analytics, to reveal journalistic information that is otherwise protected by 
law. 
Nonetheless, we recognise that this may not be sufficient. A practical obstacle still stands in the way 
of ensuring these minimum standards in law. As Tom Hickman has argued cogently on the limitations 
of public law, judicial review is beyond the capability of most people (Hickman, 2017). If protection 
is only afforded to the rich, it cannot be fair and efficient protection. The point can be extended to the 
difficulty of bringing other types of legal challenges too: the costs and complexity of mounting a 
defence or challenging a court order are often prohibitive, especially to individuals and small media 
organisations.  
Technology  
This chapter has thus far concentrated on the legal risks to sources and journalists, and has discussed 
technological change in that context. However, rapid technological development in the 20th and 21st 
Centuries has had an impact on source protection beyond the law. It is to this that we now turn. The 
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appearance and widespread use of digital communication technologies, including internet based 
services, have been great enablers for freedom of expression – an individual wishing to reach a large 
audience no longer needs the financial resource to buy a printing press.7 At the same time, however, 
digital communication methods have also allowed increased state and corporate capacity for 
surveillance. The technological protections for sources have not kept pace with the ability of states 
and other actors to use technology to intercept or monitor communications. Increasingly, journalists 
have become aware that any digital or other direct contact with a source who wishes to remain 
anonymous can make keeping a promise of confidentiality very difficult (see, for example, Posetti, 
2015; Pearson, 2015). These difficulties have been brought into stark focus during contemporary 
debates about surveillance in the UK. Journalistic sources, and journalists, are increasingly vulnerable 
to being identified by state agencies and other actors.  
Practical responses 
However, technology – as well as presenting challenges for those who wish to protect their sources – 
also offers opportunities. There are a number of potential technological tools available to facilitate the 
protection of sources, and anonymous whistleblowing. A full survey of these is, again, beyond the 
scope of this chapter, but recommended resources can be found elsewhere (see Carlo and Kamphuis, 
2016). Suffice to say for present purposes, that the resources available to journalists and their sources 
include tools such as SecureDrop, the secure deletion of information, the encryption of 
communication, and the encryption of internet browsing. These afford a response to the legal and 
technological difficulties that make it difficult for journalists to protect their sources. 
Yet, at our meeting, practitioner journalists raised concerns about how these tools work in practice. 
For example, in respect of secure online submission systems, it was said that use of these was tricky 
to achieve without leaving digital footprints. These footprints can lead to the revelation of the identity 
of a source. Moreover, the difficulties in avoiding or minimising such a trail are enhanced where 
inexperienced or vulnerable sources are communicating with journalists, or where communication 
takes place through an intermediary. Even in situations where this is not the case, participants noted 
that jigsaw identification of sources via several pieces of information was a possibility. These, it was 
said, are not resolved by secure online deposit box technology. 
Moreover, there are problems that arise from the very nature of anonymous secure online deposit 
systems. Anonymity is clearly one way of protecting source identity, and can be built into such tools. 
However, anonymity raises problems of its own. It makes it impossible, or very difficult, to assess the 
motivations and provenance of material provided to journalists. That means it is difficult for a 
responsible investigative journalist to use the material delivered by them, because they cannot be sure 
of its provenance, veracity, context, and the motive of the source. Knowledge of such information can 
be crucial in an evaluation of whether it is in the public interest to investigate and report. That said, it 
was observed that there might be other tools that could be used to overcome this difficulty, and 
OnionShare, an anonymous and secure filesharing tool, was mentioned as one.  
Turning to secure means of communication, there are valuable tools available, such as the encryption 
programmes Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) and GNU Privacy Guard (GPG). PGP was essential to Glenn 
Greenwald’s reporting of the Snowden revelations. However, the appropriateness of information 
security methods will vary in different circumstances, and not least because even the experts can find 
it difficult to use them correctly. Indeed, Glenn Greenwald very nearly missed his scoop, because he 
did not use encryption. In the words of Micah Lee, security engineer and journalist at the Intercept: 
“Greenwald didn’t use encryption and didn’t have the time to get up to speed, so Snowden moved on” 
after making initial anonymous contact with the journalist (Lee, 2014). Luckily for Greenwald, the 
story found him via another route, through the filmmaker Laura Poitras, who did use GPG.  
But even this route was not easy. To get in touch with her initially, Snowden had first to contact 
Micah Lee, to obtain her GPG key. Moreover, Lee’s account of his crucial role in the process exposes 
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the potential for source identification even with a source as technologically competent as Snowden. In 
his first email to Lee, Snowden (writing anonymously) had forgotten to attach his key, which meant 
that Lee could not encrypt his response. Therefore, Lee was forced to send him an unencrypted email 
requesting his key. Lee comments: “His oversight was of no security consequence - it didn’t 
compromise his identity in any way - but it goes to show how an encryption system that requires users 
to take specific and frequent actions almost guarantees mistakes will be made, even by the best users” 
(Lee, 2014).  
If it is difficult for professionals to protect themselves using these technical tools, it is even more 
difficult for non-professionals. A participant directly working with whistleblowers emphasised this 
point, when observing that many people do not think about encryption; sources with Edward 
Snowden’s mindset and technical background are rare. For many sources, the main concern is going 
public; and when they are dealing with the media, to what extent they trust the journalist. Encryption, 
and similar ways of covering their digital tracks, is a secondary consideration for such people. 
Given these opportunities to slip up, some of our participants wondered if old fashioned and pre-
digital methods could still serve a purpose; for example, receiving information by post, fax or hand-
delivery. Another suggested that reporters could advertise online when they will be in the office, so an 
individual could find them in person. While this could be useful in some situations, another 
participant - a freelance - observed that this would not necessarily help those journalists who operated 
without an office base. And, in any event, any contact between a source and a journalist could still be 
vulnerable to surveillance, by tracking smart phone locations, for example. In addition, as Smyth and 
O’Brien argue:  
the capability to tap your computer or phone has been decentralized and privatized… that 
power is potentially in the hands of a far wider group: people sharing [a] wireless network at a 
cybercafé can snoop on your instant messages… hackers can break into your email account; 
to minimise risks of state and private interference investigative journalists should always 
adopt appropriate data security protocols’ (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012: 17).  
Risk assessment, in the end, will be essential, and this requires thinking about who the target of the 
information is, what resources are available to them, whether they have the motive to seek to identify 
a source, and whether they have the opportunity to do so. Thinking through this process is of central 
importance before any communication takes place. In practice of course, as the Snowden-Greenwald 
example shows, this is not always possible, and even when it is, it is not always the complete answer. 
Ultimately, therefore, we feel there is no technological solution to the threats to source protection for 
journalists. These are questions of human interaction, and the ideal protection of sources comes from 
the behaviour of sources and journalists. Technology is a tool: but more important than the tool, is the 
way it is used by human beings.  
Conclusion   
These legal and technological threats to the protection of anonymous sources’ identity and 
communications return us to our original question. Given these legal and practical difficulties of 
protecting a source evident from both our discussions with practitioners and a review of the literature, 
what should a journalist do? In our report of February 2017 we make recommendations, divided into 
actions for different actors. We have mentioned some specific suggestions on current law and policy 
(namely, the Investigatory Powers Act and the Digital Economy Bill, passing through Parliament at 
the time of writing), that we feel should sufficiently protect journalists and their anonymous sources 
in ways that are compliant with the UK’s international human rights obligation, particularly those 
under the ECHR. Essential to this is the provision of independent judicial oversight regimes to 
safeguard legitimate protection. Comparable points, though obviously transposed to different 
doctrinal contexts, can be made in other jurisdictions. 
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For journalists and news organisations, our recommendations also apply more broadly than the UK. 
We focus on the care journalists should show for sources, and suggest they and their organisations 
should review and strengthen policies on secure technology, source care and protection. We suggest 
that they consider how journalists engage with sources that wish to remain anonymous, and offer and 
participate in training on working with confidential sources to make journalists and sources aware of 
the practicalities and limitations of source care and protection. We also identify a number of research 
questions that need further study. It was evident from our discussion that we needed to draw on better 
empirical evidence on the extent to which different jurisdictions offer protection for whistleblowers 
and journalists, and whether lessons can be learned from legislation in other territories. It is clear that 
we need to interrogate definitions of journalism and evaluate whether this can help the drafting of 
source protection laws.  
Against this background, we also see the need to re-visit international journalists’ ethical codes. We 
feel there should be additional provisions for journalists to warn their sources of the vulnerabilities of 
their communication before offering assurances of anonymity. The Society of Professional Journalists 
in the United States, for example, says that anonymity should be reserved ‘for sources who may face 
danger, retribution or other harm, and have information that cannot be obtained elsewhere’ (Society of 
Professional Journalists, 2014). We feel this limitation – and similar limitations – is not enough, nor 
are the general provisions on harm avoidance sufficient. There is scope for ensuring that additional 
information about a source’s vulnerability is provided before proceeding with the contact.  
In sum, we conclude that a journalist should continue to strive for confidentiality, but need to be alert 
to the legal and technological dangers that might reveal their sources. They should consider when it 
would be appropriate to share their concerns with a source. Not all anonymous sources will anticipate 
the potential for interception as Edward Snowden did, or take such extreme steps to protect their 
identity. There may be an ethical obligation to inform them of their vulnerability before offering 
confidentiality and proceeding with the investigation. These obligations arise because it is very 
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1Material in this chapter is drawn from a research project undertaken by the authors in 
autumn 2016 at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies with the support of Guardian News 
and Media, and published as a working report (Townend and Danbury, 2017). The authors 
offer their thanks to all who contributed to this initiative and in particular, Dr Andrew Scott 
(LSE) and Gillian Phillips (The Guardian) for their assistance with building an overview of 
the relevant law. Of course, all errors and commissions remain the authors’ own.    
2 It is important to note a point that follows from this. In this chapter we discuss the issue of 
journalistic source protection, and protecting journalists’ sources. However, we do not 
necessarily mean to confine the arguments we advance to institutional journalists. They can 
apply to what can be called functional journalists too – those undertaking journalistic activity, 
without being members of an institution of journalism. Whether they do or not is a complex 
and important area, but depends on a discussion beyond the scope of this chapter. We touch 
on it briefly in the conclusion.  
3 1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold 
opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public 
authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the 
licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. (2) The exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in 
a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, 
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information 
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 
4 1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of 
this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic 
society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for 
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
5 Although it is not perfect. A significant problem, which we return to at the end of this 
chapter, results from the transaction costs involved in defending a legal action that seeks a 
source, and the chill those costs entail. It may well be cheaper and easier for a journalist or a 
journalistic organisation – particularly smaller operations and freelances – to release source 
related information that is requested of them by a lower court, than to appeal such an order. 
6 This section derives from Dr Andrew Scott’s presentation at the ILPC workshop (ILPC, 
2017). 
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7 In 1960 AJ Liebling famously noted that “Freedom of the press is guaranteed only to those 
who own one” (Liebling, 1964; and see Breiner, 2014). 
